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ARTICLES
The Tragedy of the Anticommons:
A Concise Introduction and Lexicon
Michael Heller*
This article gives a concise introduction to the ‘tragedy of the anticommons.’The anticommons
thesis is simple: when too many people own pieces of one thing, nobody can use it. Usually, private
ownership creates wealth. But too much ownership has the opposite effect – it leads to wasteful
underuse.This is a free market paradox that shows up all across the global economy. If too many
owners control a single resource, cooperation breaks down, wealth disappears, and everybody loses.
Conceptually, underuse in an anticommons mirrors the familiar problem of overuse in a ‘tragedy
of the commons.’ The field of anticommons studies is now well-established. Over a thousand
scholars have detailed examples from across the innovation frontier, including drug patenting,
telecom licensing, climate change, compulsory land purchase, oil field unitisation, music and art
copyright, and post-socialist economic transition. Fixing anticommons tragedy is a key challenge
for any legal system committed to innovation and economic growth.

Some years ago, a drug company executive presented me with an unsettling
puzzle. His scientists had found a potential treatment for Alzheimer’s disease, but
they couldn’t develop it for the market unless the company bought access to
dozens of patents. Any single patent owner could demand a huge payoff; some
blocked the whole deal.This story does not have a happy ending.The drug sits
on the shelf though it might have saved millions of lives and earned billions of
dollars.1
Here’s a second high stakes puzzle: what’s the most underused natural resource
in America? The answer may be a surprise. It’s the air waves. Over 90 per cent is
dead air because ownership of broadcast spectrum is so fragmented. As a result,
America’s information economy is relatively hobbled; wireless broadband capacity lags far behind that in Japan and Korea.The cost of spectrum underuse may
be in the trillions.
And another puzzle: why do we waste weeks of our lives stuck in airports? Bad
law for real estate assembly. In America, air travel was deregulated thirty-five years
*Lawrence A.Wien Professor of Real Estate Law, Columbia Law School.This article is adapted from the
41st Annual Chorley Lecture given at the London School of Economics, 12 June 2012 (finally revised
10 October 2012).The article draws substantially from the Preface and from Chapter 2 of M.A. Heller,
The Gridlock Economy: How Too Much Ownership Wrecks Markets, Stops Innovation, and Costs Lives (New
York: Basic Books, 2008).
1 The fullest account of anticommons theory and solutions appears in The Gridlock Economy ibid. On
the anticommons in drug patents, see ibid 49–78 (chapter 3); in telecom, see ibid 79–106 (chapter
4); in land, see ibid 107–142 (chapter 5). See also M. A. Heller (ed), Commons and Anticommons
(Cheltenham, UK: Elgar Publishing, 2011) (collecting and reprinting, in two volumes, the key
scholarly articles on the theory and economics of commons and anticommons property).
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ago.The number of fliers has tripled. So how many new airports have been built
since 1975? One. Denver.You can’t build new airports, not anywhere, because
multiple landowners can block every project. Twenty-five new runways at
America’s busiest airports would end most routine air travel delays in the country.
Imagine that.
All these puzzles share a common cause: when too many people own pieces
of one thing, nobody can use it.The anticommons thesis is that simple: when too
many people own pieces of one thing, nobody can use it. Usually, private
ownership creates wealth. But too much ownership has the opposite effect – it
leads to resource underuse in an anticommons. This is a free market paradox I
discovered and it shows up all across the global economy. If too many owners
control a single resource, cooperation breaks down, wealth disappears, and
everybody loses.
There has been an unnoticed revolution in how we create wealth. In the old
economy, twenty or thirty years ago, you invented a product and got a patent;
you wrote a song and got a copyright; you subdivided land and built houses.
Today, the leading edge of wealth creation requires assembly. From drugs to
telecom, software to semiconductors, anything high-tech demands the assembly
of innumerable patents. And it’s not just high tech that’s changed – today,
cutting edge art and music are about mashing up and remixing many
separately-owned bits of culture. Even with land, the most socially-important
projects, like new runways, require assembling multiple parcels. Innovation has
moved on, but we are stuck with old-style ownership that’s easy to fragment
and hard to put together.
Fixing anticommons tragedy is a key challenge for our time. Some solutions
are entrepreneurial; for example, people can profit from finding creative ways to
bundle ownership. Philanthropists can assemble patents for disease cures. Political
advocacy and legal reform will be needed to secure solutions. But the first and
most important step in solving anticommons tragedy is to name it and make it
visible. This article takes that step by briefly introducing the anticommons
lexicon. With the right language, anyone can spot links among anticommons
puzzles, and all can come together to fix them.
COMMONS AND ANTICOMMONS

To understand the dilemma of resource underuse in an anticommons, it is helpful
to start with overuse in a commons. Aristotle was among the first to note how
shared ownership can lead to overuse: ‘That which is common to the greatest
number has the least care bestowed upon it . . . each thinks chiefly of his own,
hardly at all of the common interest; and only when he is himself concerned as
an individual.’2
2 Aristotle, The Politics and the Constitution of Athens (S. Everson (ed), B. Jowett (trans) Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 1996) 33. Before Aristotle, Thucydides noted that people ‘devote a very small
fraction of time to the consideration of any public object, most of it to the prosecution of their own
objects. Meanwhile each fancies that no harm will come to his neglect, that it is the business of
© 2013 The Author.The Modern Law Review © 2013 The Modern Law Review Limited.
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Why do people overuse and destroy things that they value? Perhaps they are
shortsighted or dim-witted, in which case reasoned discussion or gentle persuasion may help. But even the clear-headed can overuse a commons, for good
reasons. The most intractable overuse tragedy arises when individuals choose
rationally to consume a common pool of scarce resources even though each
knows that the sum of these decisions destroys the resource for all. In such
settings, reason cuts the wrong way and gentle persuasion is ineffective. In other
words, I do what’s best for me, you do what’s best for you, and no one pays heed
to the sustainability of the shared resource.
Ecologist Garrett Hardin captured this dynamic well when he coined the
phrase tragedy of the commons.3 In 1968 he wrote,‘Ruin is the destination toward
which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes
in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.’4
Since Hardin wrote these lines, thousands have identified additional areas susceptible to overuse and commons tragedy.5
In addition, Hardin’s metaphor inspired a search for solutions. Most solutions
revolve around two main approaches: regulation or privatisation. Suppose a
common lake is being overfished. Regulators can step in and decide who can
fish, when, how much, and with what methods. Such direct ‘command-andcontrol’ regulation has dropped from favor, however, partly because it fails so
often and partly because of disenchantment with socialist-type regulatory
control.
These days, regulators are more likely to look for some way to privatise access
to the lake.They know that divvying up ownership can create powerful personal
incentives to conserve. Harvest too many fish in your own lake today, starve
tomorrow; invest wisely in the lake, profit forever. Extrapolating from such
experience, legislators and voters reason – wrongly – that if some private property
is a good thing, more must be better. In this view, privatisation can never go too
far.
Until now, ownership, competition, and markets – the guts of modern
capitalism – have been understood through the opposition suggested by figure 1.
Private property solves the tragedy of the commons. Privatisation beats regulation. Market competition outperforms state control. Capitalism trounces socialism. But these simple oppositions mistake the visible forms of ownership for the
whole spectrum.The assumption is fatally incomplete.

somebody else to look after this or that for him; and so, by the same notion being entertained by
all separately, the common cause imperceptibly decays’ History of the Peloponnesian War (R. Crawley
(trans), New York: E.P. Dutton, 1910) bk 1, sec 141.
3 G. Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ (1968) 162 Science 1243, 1244. The power of
Hardin’s rhetoric sometimes exceeded the reach of his data. For example, Hardin’s work overlooks
the important distinction between ‘open access’ and ‘limited access commons’. On the implications
of this distinction for common pool resource dilemmas, see below n 15 and accompanying
text.
4 Hardin, ibid 1244.
5 See, eg, ‘The Digital Library of the Commons’ http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu (last visited 2 October
2012).
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Figure 1: The standard solution to commons tragedy

Privatising a commons may cure the tragedy of wasteful overuse, but it may
inadvertently spark the opposite. English lacks a term to denote wasteful underuse. To describe this type of fragmentation, I coined the phrase tragedy of the
anticommons.6 The term covers any setting in which too many people can block
each other from creating or using a scarce resource. Rightly understood, the
opposite of overuse in a commons is underuse in an anticommons.
This concept makes visible the hidden half of our ownership spectrum, a
world of social relations as complex and extensive as any we have previously
known (see figure 2). Beyond normal private property lies anticommons ownership. As one commentator notes, ‘To simplify a little, the tragedy of the
commons tells us why things are likely to fall apart, and the tragedy of the
anticommons helps explain why it is often so hard to get them back together.’7

Figure 2: Revealing the hidden half of the ownership spectrum

Making anticommons ownership visible is not easy. Let me give you an image
that I have found helpful in crystallising the abstract idea. A thousand years ago,
the Rhine was one of the world’s great trade routes. Boatmen traded under the
protection of the Holy Roman Emperor.When the Emperor weakened in the
13th century, freelance German barons built castles and began collecting their own
illegal tolls.The growing gauntlet of ‘robber baron’ castles, over 200 at one point,
make for a wonderful bicycling holiday today, but made shipping impracticable
back then. The river continued to flow, but for 500 years, boatmen would not
bother making the journey. As one boatman’s plaintive song went:
6 M.A. Heller,‘The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets’
(1998) 111 Harvard Law Review 621, 624. In turn, my term builds on earlier conceptual work by
Frank Michelman, ibid 667–669 (discussing evolution of the concept); see also F. J. Michelman,
‘Ethics, Economics and the Law of Property’ (1982) 24 Nomos 3 (discussing what he calls the
‘regulatory regime’).
7 L. A. Fennell, ‘Common Interest Tragedies’ (2004) 98 Northwestern University Law Review 907,
936–937.
© 2013 The Author.The Modern Law Review © 2013 The Modern Law Review Limited.
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The Rhine can count more tolls than miles
And knight and priestling grind us down
The tollman’s heavy hand falls first,
Behind him stands the greedy line
Master of tolls, assayer, scribe
Four man deep they tap the wine.8

Everyone suffered – even the robber barons.The European economic pie shrank.
Wealth disappeared. Too many tolls meant too little trade. To understand anticommons tragedy, just update this image. Phantom tollbooths today emerge
whenever ownership first arises and property is being created all the time in ways
many of us do not realise. Today’s robber barons are often private owners and
public regulators, all the people holding vetoes on the path to innovation.Today’s
missing river trade takes the form of crushed entrepreneurial energy and forgone
investment.When too many public decision makers or private owners can block
access to a resource, they harm us all.
Often, we think that governments need only to create clear property rights
and then get out of the way. So long as rights are clear, owners can trade in
markets, move resources to higher valued uses, and generate wealth. But clear
rights and ordinary markets are not enough.The anticommons perspective shows
that the content of property rights matters as much as the clarity.Wasteful underuse
can arise when ownership rights and regulatory controls are too fragmented.
Making the tragedy of the anticommons visible upends our intuitions about
private property. Private property can no longer be seen as the end point of
ownership. Privatisation can go too far, to the point where it destroys rather than
creates wealth. Too many owners paralyse markets because everyone blocks
everyone else. Well-functioning private property is a fragile balance poised
between the extremes of overuse and underuse.
THE MAGICAL PARKING LOT

So far, I’ve introduced the nutshell version of the commons and anticommons.
To understand the concepts more fully, imagine you’ve discovered an empty
paved lot near Leicester Square in London.At first, the parking paradise is free and
open to all. No one tickets or tows.You park and go to the theater. No problem.
Later, you tell friends, who park there too. No problem. But then others notice,
and soon the lot is jammed. Cars are blocked in. Doors are dinged. Fights break
out.The lot becomes a scary place.You pay to park elsewhere.
This overused lot is an example of a tragedy of the commons. It’s a tragedy
because every parker is acting reasonably, but their individual actions quickly sum
to collective disaster. Similarly, if a single shepherd has access to a field, the result
is well-trimmed grass and fat sheep. But open the field to all shepherds, each of
whom may add sheep without regard to the others, and soon there may be
nothing left but bare dirt and hungry animals.
8 J. P. Chamberlain, The Regime of the International Rivers: Danube and Rhine (NewYork: Columbia UP,
1923) 148.
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Overuse tragedies are everywhere: species extinction, ozone depletion, and
highway congestion. After Garrett Hardin popularised the ‘tragedy of the
commons’ metaphor in 1968, people gained a new language for a phenomenon
that was widely experienced, but had been difficult to name.The concept helped
people give voice to then-emerging concerns about environmental degradation.
Metaphors can be powerful. The tragedy of the commons concept revealed
hidden links among innumerable resource dilemmas, large and small. Spotting
this shared structure helped people identify shared solutions. For example, the
International Association for the Study of the Commons brings together a global
network of scholars, policymakers, and practitioners, while the Digital Library of
the Commons hosts an online database that cites about fifty thousand articles
related to the commons.9
How do we solve such tragedies? There are three distinct approaches: privatisation and markets, cooperative engagement, and political advocacy and regulation. Bear in mind that each solution has an analogue on the anticommons side
of the property spectrum.
Private property and market transactions can solve overuse tragedy. Recall that
in the parking example, you were the first to discover the empty lot.You might
claim ownership for yourself based on your original discovery and first possession. Being first is a standard (but not necessarily fair or efficient) way to hand
out rights in resources. Another path to private ownership passes through state
control. The state might reject your claim of original discovery and instead
appropriate the lot and auction it to the highest bidder or transfer it quietly to a
crony. However the lot arrives in private hands, it will likely be managed better
than if it had remained open to all. Owners can profit if they spruce up the lot,
repave it perhaps, paint lines, and keep it clean, safe, and well used.As a parker in
a private property regime, you lose the freedom of the commons but gain order
and access.
The moral justifications for private ownership are controversial for philosophers, but as a practical matter, moving to private property often does prevent
overuse in a commons. Harold Demsetz, author of the leading economic theory
of ownership, argues that this ‘conservation effect’ is the main reason private
property emerges in, and provides a benefit to, society.10
Because of our private-property focus, we tend to overlook cooperative
solutions to overuse dilemmas. Cooperative solutions are often small-scale,
context specific, local, and not reliant on legal structures – thus invisible. In the
case of our magical parking lot, notes under windshields, gossip on the street, and
other neighborly devices can coordinate the parkers. Parkers may figure out how
to keep the parking lot running smoothly without state coercion or private
ownership. In Governing the Commons, Ostrom demonstrated that close-knit
communities around the world have succeeded in managing group property

9 On the IASC, see http://www.iascp.org (last visited 2 October 2012). On the Digital Library of the
Commons, see n 6 above.
10 See H. Demsetz,‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights’ (1967) 57 American Economic Review, Papers
and Proceedings 347, 354–359.
© 2013 The Author.The Modern Law Review © 2013 The Modern Law Review Limited.
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without tragic outcomes.11 There are thousands of stories of successful cooperation that preserve contested resources and promote overall social welfare.
Finally, state coercion can solve overuse. Cooperative mechanisms may break
down if there are too many newcomers coming and going, if people don’t really
know each other, or if it is otherwise hard to discipline deviants. Then, parkers
may move from polite notes under windshields to breaking antennae, purposely
scratching cars, slashing tires, and fistfights.The state might assert ownership over
the lot, put up a gate, and hand out or sell parking permits. But bureaucracy is
costly and often capricious. Political pressure may lead to bizarre uses of the lot.
States are rarely nimble or efficient parking-lot operators. Public ownership and
management can eliminate the tragedy of the parking-lot commons, but they
may create new costs and inconveniences for the parkers.
Privatising a commons may cure the tragedy of wasteful overuse and lead to
orderly parking; but it also may inadvertently spark the opposite, a lot that no one
can use.The tragedy of the anticommons describes this problem of wasteful underuse.
Though the anticommons concept refers at its core to fragmented ownership, the
idea extends to fragmented decision-making more generally. Resource use often
depends on the outcome of some regulatory process. If the regulatory drama
involves too many uncoordinated actors – neighbors and advocacy groups; local,
state and federal legislators; agencies and courts – the sheer multiplicity of players
may block use of the underlying resource.
How could the parking lot become an anticommons? Recall that underuse in
an anticommons is the mirror image of overuse in a commons. Much can go
wrong when politicians privatise state-owned resources, when resources are
owned for the first time, or when owners divvy up property later on. For
example, in privatising the lot, politicians might not want to annoy parkers who
are also voters. So they might give free parking spots based on every parker’s
previous use of the lot. (This is approximately how US regulators have allocated
ocean fishing quotas and tradable pollution permits.) If there are thousands of
parkers, but say one hundred spots, dozens might have to share each spot.
Assembling the fractional shares back into a usable parking lot would require too
many deals. Even if each parker behaved reasonably, bargaining is costly. And
many of us are not reasonable, especially at seven o’clock in Leicester Square
when shows are about to start. So the ‘privatised’ lot may sit empty and unused
– an anticommons.
Now substitute sheep in a meadow for the parkers in the lot. If a common
field were privatised down to the square inch, no shepherd would be able to graze
a single sheep. The same might happen if innumerable heirs separately owned
scattered strips of an ancestor’s farm. In an anticommons, the grass may be lush
and tall and unused; in a commons, it may be picked bare. In both cases, the
pasturage can be wasted and the sheep starve.

11 See generally E. Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990) 1–28 (setting out the theoretical framework); E. Ostrom,
‘Coping with Tragedies of the Commons’ (1999) 2 Annual Review of Political Science 493 (discussing
solutions).
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The parking lot and shepherd’s field show that creating private property can
solve the problem of overuse in a commons. But privatisation can go too far.
When it does, we can tip into an anticommons, and again everyone loses.Adding
the concepts of underuse and anticommons makes visible a new frontier for
private bargaining, political debate, and wealth creation. Our goal should be to
find the sweet spot for property rights, between commons and anticommons.
THE NEW WORLD OF USE

My tales of the magical parking lot are a bit of a sleight of hand. They give a
succinct overview of overuse and underuse, commons and anticommons. But
underuse and anticommons are still squiggly – until recently, my Word spellchecker
rejected them by underlining each with red squiggles, and instead suggested
undersea and anticommunist as replacements. These squiggles are a signal: the
nonexistence of a word can be as telling as its presence.When we lack a term to
describe some social condition, it is because the condition does not exist in most
people’s minds. So, it should be no surprise that we have overlooked the hidden
costs of anticommons ownership.We cannot easily fix the problem until we have
created a shared lexicon to spot tragedies of the anticommons.
Besides highlighting the language problem, the squiggles prompted me to look
around the Internet at overuse and underuse. Googling overuse yielded about ten
million hits in late 2012, while underuse generated under one million. (Commons
had 800 million hits and anticommons had 25,000.) To me, the data immediately
suggest two possibilities: either overuse is about ten times more important a social
problem than underuse, or we are only about ten percent as aware of underuse
as we should be.You will not be surprised that I believe the latter to be correct.
To understand the Google results, start with overuse.According to the Oxford
English Dictionary (OED), overuse entered the language as a verb in the early
1600s. One of the earliest usages is as apt today as it was centuries ago:‘When ever
we overuse any lower good we abuse it.’ By 1862, the noun form was well
recognised: ‘The oyster beds are becoming impoverished, partly by over-use.’12
Overuse continues to mean ‘to use too much’ and ‘to injure by excessive force,’
definitions that have been stable for hundreds of years. Many of Google’s top
links for overuse come from medicine. Doctors diagnose ‘overuse syndrome’ and
dozens of ‘overuse injuries’ – injuries from too much tennis, running, violin
playing, book reading, whatever. So what is the opposite of overuse?
Ordinary use. The opposite of injuring yourself through too much use and
excessive force is staying injury free by using an ordinary amount of force.
Instead of abandoning an activity, do it in a reasonable, sustainable way. In
medicine as in everyday language, the opposite of overuse is ordinary use
(figure 3). Since the 1600s, overuse and ordinary use have been an either-or
proposition. Either you will feel pain in your elbow, or you will be able to play
happily, if not well.When you overuse a resource, bad things happen. It is much
better to engage in ordinary use.
12 OED, ‘overuse, v.’ at http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/135291 (last visited 2 October 2012).
© 2013 The Author.The Modern Law Review © 2013 The Modern Law Review Limited.
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Figure 3: Ordinary use as the end point

How do we achieve ordinary use? Recall the problem of the magical parking
lot. The usual solutions to tragedies of the commons are, as I’ve mentioned,
privatisation, cooperation, and regulation. These three solutions map onto the
traditional view that ownership can be organised into three basic types of
property: private, commons, and state (figure 4).13

Figure 4: The trilogy of ownership

We all have strong intuitions about private property, but the term is surprisingly hard to pin down. A good starting point is William Blackstone, the
foundational eighteenth-century British legal theorist. His oft-quoted definition
of private property is ‘that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and
exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of
any other individual in the universe.’14 In this view, private property is about an
individual decision maker who directs resource use.
Commons property refers to shared resources, resources for which there is no
single decision maker. In turn, the commons can be divided into two distinct
categories.The first is open access, a regime in which no one at all can be excluded,
like anarchy in the parking lot or on the high seas. Mistakenly, the legal and
economics literatures have long conflated the commons with open access,
hence reinforcing the link between commons and tragedy. The second type of
commons has many names, but for now let’s call it group access, a regime in which
a limited number of commoners can exclude outsiders but not each other. If the
ocean is open access, then a small pond surrounded by a handful of landowners
may be group access (or consider the shared mews behind houses in Notting Hill,
London’s keyholder-only squares, and New York City’s Gramercy Park). Group
13 On the property trilogy, see M. A. Heller, ‘The Dynamic Analytics of Property Law’ (2001) 2
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 79, 82–92.
14 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England: In Four Books, bk 2, *2.

14

© 2013 The Author.The Modern Law Review © 2013 The Modern Law Review Limited.
(2013) 76(1) MLR 6–25

Michael Heller

access is often overlooked even though it is the predominant form of commons
ownership and often not tragic at all.15
State property resembles private property in that there is a single decision
maker but differs in that resource use is directed through some process that is, in
principle, responsive to the needs of the public as a whole. In recent years, state
property has become less central as a theoretical category: the cold war is over,
most socialist states have disappeared, intense state regulation of resources has
dropped from favor, and privatisation has accelerated.Today, for many observers,
the property trilogy can be reduced to an opposition of private and commons
property, what one scholar calls simply ‘all and none’ (figure 5).16

Figure 5: The familiar split in ownership

I believe a substantial cause of our cultural blindness to the costs of fragmented ownership arises from the dominance of this too simple image of
property. Note how the commons–private opposition tracks the overuse–
ordinary use opposition.The former implies that there is nothing beyond private
property; the latter suggests that we cannot overshoot ordinary use. Together,
these oppositions reinforce the political and economic logic of the global push
toward privatisation.We assume, without reflection, that the solution to overuse
in a commons is ordinary use in private ownership.This logic makes it difficult
to imagine underuse dilemmas and impossible to see the uncharted world
beyond private property.
According to the OED, underuse is a recent coinage. In its first recorded
appearance, in 1960, the word was hedged about with an anxious hyphen and
scare quotes: ‘There might, in some places, be a considerable “under-use” of
[parking] meters.’ By 1970, copy editors felt sufficiently comfortable to cast aside
the quotes:‘A country can never recover by persistently under-using its resources,
as Britain has done for too long.’The hyphen began to disappear around 1975.17
In the OED, this new word means ‘to use something below the optimum’ and
‘insufficient use.’ The reference to an ‘optimum’ suggests to me how underuse
entered English. It was, I think, an unintended consequence of the increasing role
of cost-benefit analysis in public policy debates. What happens when we slot

15 On open access versus group access property, see T. Eggertsson, ‘Open Access versus Common
Property’ in T. Anderson and F. McChesney (eds), Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict, and Law
(NewYork: Princeton UP, 2003) 74–85. I advocate that we use the term liberal commons to describe
many forms of legally sanctioned group ownership. See generally H. Dagan and M.A. Heller,‘The
Liberal Commons’ (2001) 110 Yale Law Journal 549.
16 Y. Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989) 71.
17 OED, ‘under-use, n.’ at http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/212195 (last visited 2 October 2012).
© 2013 The Author.The Modern Law Review © 2013 The Modern Law Review Limited.
(2013) 76(1) MLR 6–25

15

The Anticommons

underuse into the opposition in figure 3? Although the result seems simple, it
leads to conceptual turmoil (figure 6).

Figure 6: The new spectrum of use

In the old world of overuse versus ordinary use, our choices were binary and
clear-cut: injury or health, waste or efficiency, bad or good. In the new world,
we are looking for something more subtle – an ‘optimum’ along a continuum.
Looking for an optimum level of use has a surprising twist: it requires a concept
of underuse and surreptitiously changes the long-standing meaning of overuse.
Like Goldilocks, we are looking for something not too hot, not too cold, not
too much or too little – just right. Figure 7 suggests how underuse changes
our quest.

Figure 7: Goldilocks’ quest for the optimum

How can we know whether we are underusing, overusing, or optimally using
resources? It’s not easy, and not just a matter for economic analysis. Searching for
an optimum between overuse and underuse sets us on the contested path of
modern regulation of risk, an inquiry that starts with economic analysis but
quickly implicates our core beliefs.We have to put dollar values on human lives
and on the costs of overuse and underuse behaviors – a process filled with moral
and political dilemmas. I note this difficult topic to show that finding the
optimum requires the idea of underuse and that this new word in turn transforms
the meaning of overuse. Overuse no longer just means using a resource more than
an ordinary amount. The possibility of underuse reorients policy making from
relatively simple either-or choices to the more contentious trade-offs that make
up modern regulation of risk.
THE TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS

Adding the idea of ‘underuse’ sets the stage for the anticommons. Looking back
at figures 3–7, you can see there is a gap in our labeling scheme.We have seen the
complete spectrum of use, but not the analogous spectrum of ownership. What
form of ownership typically coincides with squiggly underuse? The force of
symmetry helped reveal a hidden property form. Figure 8 shows my path to the
anticommons.
16
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Figure 8: An ownership puzzle

I coined the term tragedy of the anticommons to help make visible the dilemma
of too fragmented ownership beyond private property. Just as the idea of ‘underuse’ transforms the continuum of resource use, ‘anticommons’ transforms the
continuum of ownership. It shows that the move from commons to private can
overshoot the mark (figure 9).When privatisation goes too far, resources can end
up wasted in an unfamiliar way.

Figure 9: The full spectrum of ownership

Seeing the full spectrum of ownership has another benefit. Our understanding
of commons ownership may help inform solutions to anticommons tragedy.To
start, consider the distinction between open access (anarchy open to all) and
group access (property that is commons to insiders and private to outsiders).This
distinction can do some work on the anticommons side of the spectrum as well.
The conventional wisdom has often overlooked group access, but we don’t
have to. Under the right conditions, groups of people succeed at conserving a
commons resource without regulation or privatisation.18 Cooperation can get us
to optimal use. Under what conditions does cooperation work, and what does
that teach us about fixing underuse dilemmas?
At the extreme of open access, group norms don’t stick. For example, anyone
can fish for tuna on the high seas.Tuna fleets work in relative isolation, and their
catches can be sold anonymously to diverse buyers. Conservation norms, such as
voluntary limits on fishing seasons, may gain little traction. Gossip and other
low-cost forms of policing don’t work for wide-ranging international fleets.
Unless states intervene, overuse is hard to avoid.Whales were saved from extinction more through naval powers enforcing international treaties than through
gossip at the harbor bar.
The state can sponsor hybrid solutions. What if the state asserted ownership
over lobsters and fish, and then created private rights (such as licenses and tradable
quotas) that complement cooperative solutions? Often, such hybrid regimes lead
to fairer and higher-yielding results than informal group access can achieve. For
18 See, eg, R. C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (Cambridge: Harvard UP,
1991) 167–183.
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example, in Australia, the government issues licenses for a sustainable number of
lobster traps and enforces strict harvesting limits. Lobstermen can wait to harvest
until the lobsters mature, or they can sell their government-created rights, secure
in their markets and property.With far less fishing effort, this system yields more
and bigger lobsters than US lobstermen catch either in coastal harbor gangs or on
the open ocean.19
Hybrid systems are the cutting edge of natural resource management: examples include not only tradable fishing quotas, but also carbon-emission markets
and transferable air-pollution permits.20 These solutions can work far beyond
lobsters and tuna, even beyond natural resources generally. They may reach the
edge of high-tech innovation.
Solutions to commons property dilemmas give clues to solving anticommons
tragedy. For open access, like the high seas, states must command resource use
directly or create hybrid rights, such as fishing quotas.The anticommons parallel
to open access is full exclusion in which an unlimited number of people may block
each other. With full exclusion, states must expropriate fragmented rights or
create hybrid property regimes so people can bundle their ownership. Otherwise,
the resource will be wasted through underuse.There is, however, one important
respect in which full exclusion differs from open access: an anticommons is often
invisible. You have to spot the underused resource before you can respond to
the dilemma.
Group access in a commons also has an anticommons parallel: group exclusion
in which a limited number of owners can block each other. Recall the multiple owners of our magical parking lot. For both group access and group
exclusion, the full array of market-based, cooperative, and regulatory solutions
is available. Although self-regulation may be more complex for anticommons
resources,21 close-knit fragment owners can sometimes organise to overcome
anticommons tragedy. For group exclusion resources, the regulatory focus
should be support for markets to assemble ownership and removal of roadblocks to cooperation.
Group property on the commons or anticommons side of private ownership
is exponentially more important than the rare extremes of open access or full
exclusion. Much of the modern economy – corporations, partnerships, trusts,
condominiums, even marriages – can be understood as legally structured group
property forms for resolving access and exclusion dilemmas.22 We live or die
depending on how we manage group ownership. Now, we can see the full
spectrum of property, as shown in figure 10.

19 See generally J. Tierney,‘A Tale of Two Fisheries’ NewYorkTimes 27 August 2000; J. Acheson, Lobster
Gangs of Maine (Hanover, NH: UPNE, 1988).
20 See C. M. Rose, ‘Expanding the Choices for the Global Commons: Comparing Newfangled
Tradable Allowance Schemes to Old-Fashioned Common Property Regimes’ (1999) 10 Duke
Environmental Law and Policy Forum 45.
21 See B. Depoorter and S. Vanneste, ‘Putting Humpty Dumpty Back Together: Pricing in Anticommons Property Arrangements’ (2007) 3 Journal of Law, Economics, and Policy 1.
22 See Dagan and Heller, n 15 above, 552–54; see also H. Dagan and C. J. Frantz, ‘Properties of
Marriage’ (2004) 104 Columbia Law Review 75.
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Figure 10: The full spectrum of property, revealed24

THE ECONOMICS OF THE ANTICOMMONS

After I proposed the possibility of anticommons tragedy, economist and Nobel
laureate James Buchanan and his colleague Yong Yoon undertook to create a
formal economic model. They wrote that the anticommons concept helps
explain ‘how and why potential economic value may disappear into the “black
hole” of resource underutilisation.’23 According to their model, society gets
the highest total value from a resource – say, the magical parking lot – when
a single decision maker controls its use. As more people can use the lot independently, the value goes down – a tragedy of the commons. And as more
people can block each other from the lot, the value also goes down symmetrically – a tragedy of the anticommons. Figure 11 shows their graphic summarising this finding.

Figure 11: Value symmetry in an anticommons and a commons25

After developing their proof and showing how the anticommons construct
may apply to a wide range of problems, Buchanan and Yoon concluded that
‘the anticommons construction offers an analytical means of isolating a central
feature of sometimes disparate institutional structures . . . [People] have perhaps

23 J. Buchanan and Y. J. Yoon,‘Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons’ (2000) 43 Journal
of Law and Economics 1, 2.
24 I develop an early version of this spectrum in M. A. Heller, ‘The Boundaries of Private Property’
(1999) 108 Yale Law Journal 1163, 1194–98.
© 2013 The Author.The Modern Law Review © 2013 The Modern Law Review Limited.
(2013) 76(1) MLR 6–25

19

The Anticommons

concentrated too much attention on the commons side of the ledger to the
relative neglect of the anticommons side.’26
In recent years, economic modeling of the anticommons, including game
theory approaches, has become quite sophisticated.27 At the simplest level,
anticommons theory can be understood as a legal twist on the economics
of ‘complements’ first described by Antoine-Augustin Cournot in his 1838
Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth28 (and discovered
independently by Charles Ellet in 1839 in his work on railway tariffs29). Anticommons theory is a partial corrective for modern economic models that
focus on ‘substitutes’ and often neglect the role of ‘complements’.30 What’s the
difference?
In figure 12, Railways A, B, and C are substitute ways to get from here to there.
Say the fare is 9. If railway A finds a way to provide service for 8, it will win riders.
B and C must become more efficient to keep up. In markets with robust
substitutes, competitors have incentives to innovate, lower prices, and thereby
indirectly benefit society as a whole. By contrast, Railways D, E, and F are
complements.When inputs are complementary, generally you want all or none of
them.

Figure 12: Substitutes versus complements

Again, assume the fare from here to there is 9. D, E, and F each charge 3.
Railway D knows that if you want to ride, you must buy its ticket. So why
innovate? Instead, D may raise its fare to 5, hoping that E and F lower theirs to 2
each. But why would E and F go along? More likely, they too would raise fares,
25 ibid 8.
26 ibid 12.
27 See F. Parisi, ‘Entropy in Property’ (2002) 50 American Journal of Comparative Law 595; F. Parisi, N.
Schulz and B. Depoorter,‘Fragmentation in Property:Towards a General Model’ (2003) 159 Journal
of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 594; see also Fennell, n 7 above (arguing that tragedies of the
commons are best modeled as prisoner’s dilemma games and anticommons as chicken games).
28 A. Cournot, Researches into the Mathematical Principles of theTheory ofWealth (1838) (N.T. Bacon trans,
1897) 99–104 (sections 55–57, introducing theory of complements).
29 C. Ellet, Jr, An Essay on the Laws of Trade in Reference to the Works of Internal Improvement in the United
States (1839).
30 On the problem of complements in an information economy, see H. R. Varian, J.V. Farrell, and C.
Shapiro, The Economics of Information Technology: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005)
43–45. On the interaction of substitutes and complements in the anticommons context, see G.
Dari-Mattiacci and F. Parisi, ‘Substituting Complements’ (2006) 2 Journal of Comparative Law and
Economics 333.
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so the total exceeds 9, and ridership falls below the optimal level.With complementary competition, incentives to innovate are blunted: if D did lower fares,
then E and F just might raise theirs.
It’s the same problem if D, E, and F are complementary patents instead of
railways. Then innovators face what economist Carl Shapiro calls a ‘patent
thicket’, a lot of phantom tollbooths on the route to commercialising new
technology.31 Cournot proved that in markets dominated by complements –
whether railways or patents – we can get higher overall social welfare if D, E, and
F merge. Here, monopoly trumps competition. Anticommons theory, in turn,
moves from railways and patents to ownership and regulation generally.All these
concepts describe facets of the same dilemma: too many uncoordinated owners
or regulators blocking optimal use of a single resource.
ANTICOMMONS PUZZLES

Our rhine boaters from a little earlier may seem an esoteric example, but there are
a near-infinity of everyday puzzles that share this common structure – one whose
solution could jump-start innovation, release trillions in productivity, and help
revive the global economy.
Let me return to the drug patent example that opens this article.The Alzheimer’s drug that never came to market is not alone. Numerous potential drugs are
lost to anticommons ownership. In the past 30 years, drug R&D has been going
steadily up, but discoveries of major new classes of drugs have been declining.
Instead, drug companies focus on minor spinoffs of existing drugs for which they
have already assembled the necessary property rights. How did this new drug
discovery gap happen? Patent anticommons. Paradoxically, more biotech patent
owners can mean fewer life-saving innovations. Drugs that should exist, could
exist, are not being created.
To date, the most debated application of anticommons theory has built on the
above example. The field was sparked in part by my article with Rebecca
Eisenberg on the anticommons in biomedical research.32 Since then, there has
been a flurry of follow-on papers, studies, and reports, many of which conclude
that patents should be harder to obtain, in part to avoid potential anticommons
tragedy effects.33 In their 2009 book, The Patent Crisis, Dan Burk and Mark
Lemley review the most recent literature on patents and biotech innovation and
conclude that, ‘the structure of the biotechnology industry seems likely to run
31 C. Shapiro,‘Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting’ in A.
B. Jaffe et al (eds), Innovation Policy and the Economy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001) vol 1, 119;
cf D. L. Burk and M. A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can Solve It (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2009) (distinguishing anticommons and patent thickets in the patent
context) 75–78, 86–92.
32 M.A. Heller and R. S. Eisenberg,‘Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical
Research’ (1998) 280 Science 698; see generally Heller, n 1 above 49–78 (Chapter 3, “Where are
the Cures?” reviewing ten years of scholarship and debate on anticommons effects in drug
development).
33 ibid 65 (discussing three influential policy-oriented reports that argue for patent reform based on
anticommons concerns).
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high anticommons risks’, particularly when companies are attempting to bring
products to market.34 However, the empirical basis for finding that anticommons
effects are stifling innovation remains inconclusive – it remains an important area
for empirical work.35
In addition, the anticommons framework has been used to analyse ownership
across the high tech frontier, ranging from Thomas Hazlett’s work on broadcast
spectrum ownership, what he calls the ‘tragedy of the telecommons’, to Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis’ study of anticommons effects in technology patenting.36 In
my Gridlock Economy book, I show that it is not just biotech that is susceptible to
anticommons tragedy. Cutting edge art and music are about mashing up and
remixing many separately owned bits of culture.37 And as I earlier said, even with
land the most socially important projects often require assembling multiple
parcels.38
Anticommons theory is now well established, but empirical studies have yet to
catch up. How hard is it to negotiate around ownership fragmentation? How
much does ownership fragmentation slow down technological innovation? Does
the effect vary by industry? It is difficult to measure discoveries that should have
been made but weren’t, industries that could exist but don’t.We are just starting
to examine these conundrums.
In 2006, a team of law, economics, and psychology researchers reported
experimental findings that rejected the presumed symmetry of commons and
anticommons. They found that anticommons dilemmas ‘seem to elicit more
individualistic behavior than commons dilemmas’ and are ‘more prone to underuse than commons dilemmas are to overuse’. The researchers conclude that ‘if
commons leads to “tragedy”, anticommons may well lead to “disaster”.’39
These preliminary findings of bargaining failure around anticommons
ownership may help provide some insight into otherwise puzzling economic
phenomena. For example, some of the world’s biggest energy companies have for
years failed to agree on joint management of oil and gas fields they own together.
34 Burk and Lemley, n 31 above 89.
35 Several survey-based studies have questioned whether anticommons tragedy is blocking academic
biomedical research. See eg, J. P.Walsh, A. Arora, and W. M. Cohen,‘Effects of ResearchTool Patents
and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation’ in W. M. Cohen and S. A. Merrill (eds), Patents in the
Knowledge-Based Economy (Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2004) 285–340, 324.
36 On the anticommons in the telecom context, see Heller, n 1 above, 79–106 (Chapter 4,‘You Can’t
Hear Me Now’). See also T.W. Hazlett,‘SpectrumTragedies’ (2005) 22 Yale Journal of Regulation 242;
R. H. Ziedonis, ‘Don’t Fence Me In: Fragmented Markets for Technology and the Patent Acquisition Strategies of Firms’ (2004) 50 Management Science 804.
37 On the anticommons in the copyright context, see Heller, ibid 9–16 (discussing tragedy in
filmmaking, art, history, and music), 27–30 (discussing the anticommons in online search, such as
Google Books). See also F. Parisi and B. Depoorter, ‘Fair Use and Copyright Protection: A Price
Theory Explanation’ (2003) 21 International Review of Law and Economics 453.
38 On the anticommons in land, see Heller, n 1 above, 107–142 (detailing anticommons tragedies and
solutions in land resources).
39 S. Vanneste et al, ‘From “Tragedy” to “Disaster”: Welfare Effects of Commons and Anticommons
Dilemmas’ (2006) 26 International Review of Law and Economics 104. Follow-up studies looked at why
negotiations fail when presented in anticommons form.They found more failure as the number and
complementarity of fragment owners increase. Also, as uncertainty increases, losses become even
more pronounced. Depoorter and Vanneste, n 21 above, 21–23.

22

© 2013 The Author.The Modern Law Review © 2013 The Modern Law Review Limited.
(2013) 76(1) MLR 6–25

Michael Heller

If one company pumps the oil too fast, it can wreck the pressure in the gas field;
if the other extracts gas too fast, it traps the oil. American law has offered them
an effective legal tool, called ‘unitisation’, to overcome anticommons tragedy and
smooth joint management of divided oil and gas interests.Yet firms block each
other year after year.40
How can this be? Oil units aren’t a case of two spiteful neighbors arguing
over a broken backyard fence. They involve arm’s-length business negotiations
between savvy corporations. Everyone has good information about the underlying geologic and technical issues. The gains from cooperation are in the
billions of dollars. Why doesn’t one firm sell its interest to the other? Why
don’t the firms merge? What’s going on? The experimental studies are beginning to give us explanations rooted in the psychology of the anticommons.
Even the most sophisticated businesspeople can fail to reach agreement when
a negotiation is framed in anticommons terms.
ROUNDING OUT THE LEXICON – CAVEATS AND CAUTIONS

In rounding out the anticommons lexicon, there are some caveats: first, my term
focuses on one form of underuse, the tragedy that arises when ownership is too
fragmented. Here, multiple owners block each other from using a scarce resource.
Underuse can also arise in the monopoly context, when a single owner blocks
access to a resource. This situation may be tragic, but it is not an anticommons
tragedy in my sense of the term.
In the old economy, many companies held monopolies – Ma Bell (the
American telephone monopoly), railways, local water utilities, and others. Society
gained the economic benefits of scale and scope from allowing these sectors to
be monopolised. The state policed against abuse of monopoly power through
complex rate regulation and oversight. Phone lines were cheaper and more
available than in many other countries.The costs of these monopolies were often
invisible, costs such as deferred and dampened innovation.
In an information economy, any piece of intangible property, such as a patent,
is also a monopoly.We award patents because monopoly profits create incentives
to invent and because patents give inventors incentives to disclose their discoveries (without patents people might prefer to invent things they could keep
secret). On the other hand, drugs would be cheaper and lives could be saved if
competitors could make generic copies at will.To balance the values of innovation, disclosure, and competition, the US Congress keeps shifting the bundle of
rights that a patent confers.
The dilemmas of any individual monopoly in the old or new economy are a
great topic, but are not relevant here. For better or worse, these quandaries are
familiar.We do not, however, have much experience dealing with the interaction
40 On the costs of ‘excessive anarchy’ in the oil industry, see G. D. Libecap and J. L. Smith, ‘The
Economic Evolution of Petroleum Property Rights in the United States’ (2002) 31 Journal of Legal
Studies S589.The same tragedy affects excessive pumping of groundwater. See B. H. Thompson Jr,
‘Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Commons’ (2000) 30 Environmental Lawyer
241, 250.
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of ownership fragments or an array of blocking patents. The anticommons
lexicon addresses not monopoly per se, but ownership multiplicity.
Next, here’s a caution: when talking about an anticommons, stay away from
absolutes. First, you shouldn’t assume that anticommons ownership is inevitably
tragic.41 If we lived in a world where people had perfect information and could
bargain with each other at no cost, they could avoid anticommons tragedy every
time (just as, in a perfect world, there would be no commons tragedy, or for that
matter, tragedy of any sort).42 In practice, however, bargaining is never free, people
shirk duties and hold out for payoffs, and there are cognitive limits that shape
owners’ decisions. In the real world, anticommons ownership is not necessarily
tragic, but it does tend that way.
Second, it’s theoretically possible that an anticommons may face overuse
instead of underuse.43 For example, consider real estate development along
the California coast. It’s a mess. Multiple community groups, environmentalists,
neighbors, and government agencies may each prefer different versions of a
project. Even in that regulatory morass, though, overbuilding may occur if it is
sufficiently costly to exercise each right to veto development. Every opponent of
development may prefer to go surfing and hope the others sit through the boring
public hearings. If enough people opt for a free ride, a project might face too little
opposition, not too much. It’s an empirical question whether the California coast
tips toward over- or under-building.That said, in most cases I’ve seen, anticommons regulation tends to be associated with too little economic development, not
too much.44
Finally, there is a caveat that comes from the legal theorist Carol Rose. Certain
resources, such as roads and waterways, are sometimes owned most efficiently in
common. As Rose points out, creating and enforcing private-property rights is
itself costly; sometimes these costs exceed the gains, not just economically but also
socially.Village greens and town halls may strengthen communities in ways that
are socially valuable but hard to quantify in monetary terms. Rose coined the
term ‘the comedy of the commons’ to describe these social and economic
benefits that can flow from group access.45
Rose’s insight is equally true on the anticommons side – there are both
economic and social reasons that we may prefer group exclusion to sole ownership. For example, it’s possible that creating multiple vetoes may help preserve
a treasured resource against transient political pressures for development – for
instance, Central Park in New York City or Indian burial grounds in Arizona.46
41
42
43
44

These points are developed in Heller, n 6 above at 676.
See generally R. H. Coase, ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960) 1 Journal of Law and Economics 1.
Fennell develops this insight in her theory of common interest tragedies, see n 7 above, 934–937.
Just as an anticommons theoretically may lead to overuse, it is possible for a commons to be
associated with underuse, ibid. For a real-world example, see W. W. Buzbee, ‘The Regulatory
Fragmentation Continuum,Westway, and the Challenges of Regional Growth’ (2005) 21 Journal of
Law and Politics 323.
45 C. M. Rose,‘The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property’
(1986) 53 University of Chicago Law Review 711; see also R. C. Ellickson,‘Property in Land’ (1993)
102 Yale Law Journal 1315, 1336–1338.
46 On the potential use of an anticommons to preserve Central Park, see A. Bell and G. Parchomovsky,
‘Of Property and Antiproperty’ (2003) 102 Michigan Law Review 1, 3–4, 31–36, 60–61.
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Similarly, ‘conservation easements’ intentionally use anticommons ownership to
foster environmental goals.47 (With a conservation easement, the owner sells or
gives away the right to develop land, gets a tax break, and retains the right to
continue a current use such as farming.)The underuse created by split ownership
may be justifiable if the environmental gains exceed fragmentation costs. On
balance, though, I’m sceptical. What happens a generation from now when
communities want to reduce sprawl but face a patchwork of easements that make
‘in-fill’ development prohibitively difficult? Many conservation easements look
to me like potential anticommons tragedies.48
The ‘comedy of the anticommons’ insight suggests that sometimes, for some
resources, we should promote little or no use. Most of the time, for most
resources, however, some positive level of use will be socially most valuable.
Underuse is rarely the optimum.
TOWARD A NON-SQUIGGLY LANGUAGE

We have millennia of practice in spotting tragedies of the commons.When too
many people fish, fisheries are depleted. When too many people pollute, we
choke on dirty air.Then, we spring into action with market-based, cooperative,
and legislative solutions. Similarly, we have a lot of experience spotting underuse
caused by a particular monopoly owner.We have created regulatory bodies that
know (more or less) what to do with such dilemmas.
But underuse caused by multiple owners is unfamiliar.The affected resource
is hard to spot. Our language is new. A tragedy of the anticommons may be as
costly to society as the more familiar forms of resource misuse, but we have never
noticed, named, debated, or learned how to fix underuse. How do we stumble
into the problem of too many owners? How do we get out? As a first step,
underuse in a tragedy of the anticommons should be squiggly no more.
Fixing anticommons tragedies is a key challenge for our time. Individual
entrepreneurship and legal reform will be important. But I want to stress that the
first and most important step to solving an anticommons is to name it and make
it visible.With the right language, we can all spot links among ownership puzzles,
and we can all come together to fix them. Nothing is inevitable about an
anticommons. Every ownership puzzle results from choices we make, and can
change, about how to control the resources we value most.

47 See J. D. Mahoney, ‘Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Future’ (2002) 88
Virginia Law Review 739, 785.
48 ibid 785–786 (noting potential anticommons tragedy in conservation easements).
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